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Abstract 
For years, the US Intelligence Community has worked to maintain the thin and 
often wavering line between civil liberty and national security in its attempts to protect 
the American people while simultaneously preserving their constitutional rights. 
However, this line has often shifted with the course of American history, including events 
such as the Alien and Sedition Acts, the establishment of the Church Committee, and the 
publication of the NSA’s data collection program. One of the most significant of these 
factors was the passage and eventual amendment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, which opened the door to later constitutional controversies. In the midst of this ever-
changing national landscape, how is the US Intelligence Community to strike a balance 
between protecting the American people and ensuring their civil freedoms?  
The Intelligence Community must remember that it has a responsibility to protect 
both the American people and their constitutional freedoms. The Intelligence Community 
faces the unique challenge of reconciling the freedom of the American people to live 
safely and the freedom of the US government, embodied by the executive branch, to lead.  
In recent history, it has done a remarkable job of instituting measures of oversight and 
enacting greater controls on itself as part of the executive branch to avoid the 
unconstitutional missteps it has taken in the past. Intelligence agencies in the present and 
future must continue to prioritize not only on the safety of the United States and its 
people but also on the maintenance of the liberties guaranteed to them under the US 
Constitution.   
 4 
Civil Liberty and National Security: The Implications of the Debate for the  
United States Intelligence Community 
For nearly as long as the United States has existed as a nation, there has been a 
perpetual struggle between the rights of the government and the rights of its citizens; in 
fact, the United States was itself the product of such tension. For decades, politicians, 
legislators, presidents, and the American public have all striven to find a balance between 
the guarantee of liberty for individual American citizens and the pressing demands of 
national security, which often appear in direct opposition. Over the centuries both 
pressure to cede greater control over the lives of its citizens to the federal government 
and countervailing pressure to reclaim individual civil liberty from government reach 
have created fluctuations in national power reflected in both federal legislative and 
executive action. The current state of domestic security concerns has arisen as a product 
of such events and corresponding actions on the part of both the American government 
and the American people, and the future condition of the intelligence and civil liberty 
balance will likewise reflect ongoing attitudes and events. Members of the Intelligence 
Community must consider the past, present, and future implications of national security 
measures in the light of civil liberty concerns in order to best protect American citizens 
both tangibly and intangibly. 
The crucial distinction to make in the debate of civil liberty and national security 
is one of perspective, particularly regarding the primacy of ideas. Which is the baseline 
for determination of the country’s atmosphere, liberty or security? Put another way, is 
civil liberty the foundation that is occasionally surrendered in the name of national 
security, or is national security the base state that is temporarily surrendered in the name 
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of civil liberty? The entire premise of the debate is comprised within this one central 
question, which Ben Franklin once answered succinctly: “Those who would give up 
essential Liberty to purchase little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”1 
This oft-quoted maxim has been historically utilized by those adamant against 
government encroachment into American freedoms as guaranteed by the founding 
documents; however, according to Benjamin Wittes with the Brookings Institute, the 
quote’s original significance was to an opposite effect.2  
Wittes recounts the history of the phrase as an influential Pennsylvania family 
attempting to avoid taxes on their property that would be used for defense purposes by 
encouraging the governor to overturn the legislature’s attempts to enforce taxation.3 
Finally, the family offered a compromise; they would contribute to the town’s defense 
voluntarily in exchange for a cessation of attempted tax legislation, thereby undermining 
the authority of the legislature in the area of defense.4 Franklin’s quote regarding liberty 
and security did not mean surrendering freedom to the government in exchange for 
government protection but dichotomously sacrificing the freedom of the government to 
act in defense of its citizens in exchange for a momentary influx of funds which could 
immediately secure that defense.5  
                                                        
1 Robert Siegel, “Ben Franklin’s Famous ‘Liberty, Safety’ Quote Lost Its Context In 21st 
Century,” NPR.org, March 2, 2015, accessed February 5, 2018, 
https://www.npr.org/2015/03/02/390245038/ben-franklins-famous-liberty-safety-quote-lost-its-context-in-
21st-century. 
 
2 Ibid. 
 
3 Ibid. 
 
4 Ibid. 
 
5 Ibid. 
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This view exposes the true heart of the civil liberty versus national security 
debate: despite countless other opinions and perspectives on the topic or related subjects, 
notwithstanding the passionate and intense rhetoric that mires the discussion in emotion, 
the center of the entire quagmire boils down to one primary question: whose liberty is 
superior? Does the state’s liberty to govern,6 under which defense is a subcategory further 
delineated to national security, supersede an individual citizen’s liberty to exist and act 
freely independently within his country, or vice versa? Abraham Lincoln asked a similar 
question when he said,  “Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties 
of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?”7 While this distinction 
clarifies the true aim of the debate, it unfortunately fails to simplify the complications, 
implications, or inevitable answer of the question. However, it does provide a proper 
perspective from which to analyze the historical evidence for each side, beginning with a 
summary of the circumstances, provisions, and results of each historical event from the 
founding of the United States through the USA PATRIOT and FREEDOM Acts, and 
their significance for the US Intelligence Community.  
History 
The document that established the American structure of government was the 
United States Constitution, which famously begins: 
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, 
promote the general welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and 
                                                        
6 Robert Siegel, “Ben Franklin’s Famous ‘Liberty, Safety’ Quote Lost Its Context in 21st Century.” 
 
7 David Bromwich, “To Maintain a Republic,” Huffingtonpost.com, September 2, 2011, accessed 
March 6, 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bromwich/to-maintain-a-republic_b_889509.html 
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posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America.8  
 
Even in its preamble, the dichotomous concepts of liberty and defense are not 
only present but interestingly lacking their traditional juxtaposition. However, the content 
of the document itself espouses a theme that runs forward through American history: the 
idea of government power limited by the will of the people, in no area more significant 
than that of military and intelligence matters. This concept entwines so thoroughly with 
the very structure of American government, from federalism to checks and balances 
between the branches of government, that it can hardly be understated. Above and 
beyond every other sentiment expressed in the nation’s founding documents, a hesitation 
regarding the concentration of power in the hands of a governmental system has always 
reigned supreme. Stated outright in the Declaration of Independence, the authority and 
liberty to govern are deliberately granted to the federal government first by the people—
“deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed”9— and then, in the Tenth 
Amendment, by the states—“The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.”10 
While the Constitution establishes the underlying foundation for the guarantee of 
rights to American citizens, liberties are directly exposited in the Bill of Rights. The ten 
amendments include various protected rights intended to secure freedom for the governed 
and dictate a proper framework of government in view of the consistent theme of the 
                                                        
8 The Essential Liberty Project, The Patriot’s Essential Liberty Pocket Guide, (USA: Publius 
Press, Inc., 2014), 37. 
 
9 Ibid., 32. 
 
10 Ibid., 49. 
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delegation of power from the people to the government. Most relevant to the discussion 
of civil liberty are the First and Fourth Amendments. The First Amendment incorporates 
five key provisions: the freedoms of speech, petition, press, religion, and assembly.11 The 
Fourth prevented the arbitrary person and property searches.12 The Tenth Amendment, 
referenced above, reserves for the states those rights not explicitly given to the federal 
government.13 The sum total of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and 
the Bill of Rights serves to provide the origin, foundation, and enumeration of the rights 
guaranteed to American citizens which are, by most accounts, straightforward. However, 
it would be less than a decade before the Constitution and the Bill of Rights faced their 
first major challenge of application in the form of the Alien and Sedition Acts.   
The Alien and Sedition Acts were enacted during the tension between France and 
the United States and dated from the Fifth US Congress in 1798.14 Caught between 
Britain and an increasingly turbulent France that threatened to pull the US into a war that 
could condemn the newborn nation to an early grave, the United States sought 
desperately for a path that would allow it to remain clear of the debris of a disintegrating 
Europe.15 However, foreign policy struggles were not the only issues that faced the 
United States; domestic squabbles between the Federalists, who leaned towards support 
                                                        
11 The Essential Liberty Project, The Patriot’s Essential Liberty Pocket Guide, 48. 
 
12 Ibid., 48-49. 
 
13 Ibid., 49. 
 
14 Alan Taylor, “The Alien and Sedition Acts,” in The American Congress: The Building of 
Democracy, ed. Julian E. Zelizer, (Boston, MAL Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 63, accessed March 30, 2018, 
https://books.google.com/books?id=_MGEIIwT5pUC&pg=PA63&lpg=PA63&dq=alan+taylor+the+alien+
and+sedition+acts&source=bl&ots=4Y2HQp8c5f&sig=d_Vz64iowqiNiijf77X5XM-
XhEo&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi3ssWEq5TaAhXH11MKHdU_DLoQ6AEIQTAD#v=onepage&q=al
an%20taylor&f=false 
 
15 Ibid., 65 
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of Britain, and the Republicans, who related more consistently to the French cause, 
created serious complications for Congress and the nation as these party confrontations 
often used legislation and other matters of national importance as pawns for their political 
gamesmanship, with devastating consequences for civil liberties.16 
 Furious over implications that France had actors working on its behalf within the 
United States, a bitterly divided Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts in an effort 
to eradicate any perilous rhetoric that could propel the young country into the European 
conflict.17 Comprised of four pieces of legislation, the Acts construed breaches of civil 
liberty that most Americans today would find unconscionable.18 The first, the 
Naturalization Act, was by far the least damaging to US freedoms, merely increasing the 
time required for a resident alien to become a citizen from five to fourteen years and 
requiring the registration of immigrants and aliens already in the United States within 
respective time periods of two days and six months.19 However, this legislation only 
arose following dissension in the Federalist ranks after the majority refused to endorse 
the original measures proposed by the party’s firebrands, which included a halt on 
immigration and a ban against the vote for immigrants who were not yet naturalized, 
intended to cripple the Republicans who derived political support from Irish immigrants 
sympathetic to Britain.20  
                                                        
16 Taylor, “The Alien and Sedition Acts,” 64-65. 
 
17 Ibid., 66. 
 
18 Ibid., 67. 
 
19 Ibid., 68. 
 
20 Ibid., 68. 
 10 
The second part of the acts, the Alien Enemies Act, granted the president 
authority to arrest and deport immigrants from enemy nations during time of war, a 
statute never utilized during its originating context.21 This measure was one of the least 
complicated of the Acts, passing both houses easily with approval from both Republicans 
and Federalists.22  
However, the luck of smooth legislation passage quickly ran out as the third 
piece, the Alien Act, began in the Senate and quickly ran into opposition.23 The Alien Act 
allowed the executive branch to order the deportation of any immigrant generically 
deemed “‘dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,’”24 without a trial or 
even official charges brought against the individual.25 The chief opponents of this 
legislation were Albert Gallatin, himself an immigrant and a Republican and 
Representative Edward Livingstone, considered by many a Federalist turncoat.26 Gallatin 
and Livingstone argued vehemently against the Alien Act, citing interestingly not 
guaranteed liberties under the Bill of Rights, which may have been overturned based 
upon the lack of citizenship of those affected, but instead using the 10th Amendment and 
the Constitution to claim that powers of immigration were not given specifically to the 
federal government and therefore were reserved to the states, rendering the Alien Act’s 
                                                        
21 Taylor, “The Alien and Sedition Acts,” 68-69. 
 
22 Ibid., 69. 
 
23 Ibid. 
 
24 Ibid. 
 
25 Ibid. 
 
26 Ibid. 
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passage at the federal level unconstitutional and ineffectual.27 The Federalists in response 
argued that such powers fell under the purview of the federal government in its 
responsibility to defend American citizens, and this logic prevailed, leading to the 
passage of the Act, which was nevertheless never put into effect by a hesitant John 
Adams before its expiration in 1800.28 
Despite the political battles, intense discussion, and overall ineffectuality of the 
previous three acts, the fourth and final piece of the Alien and Sedition Acts would prove 
to be the most constitutionally devastating and the most often applied of the group.29 
Under the Sedition Act, “it became a federal crime to utter or publish ‘any false, 
scandalous, and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States 
or the President of the United States, with intent to defame…or to bring them to contempt 
or disrepute.’”30 To any modern reader, the violation of First Amendment freedoms by 
this legislation is obvious; however, in its historical context, the Sedition Act led to 
ultimate clarification of Bill of Rights protections where previous differentiation of 
interpretations existed.31 The Federalists, with their British-influenced take on political 
understanding, referenced William Blackstone’s view of the freedoms of speech and 
press:  
‘The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this 
consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom 
from censure for criminal matter when published… Thus the will of individuals is 
                                                        
27 Taylor, “The Alien and Sedition Acts,” 69-70. 
 
28 Ibid., 70. 
 
29 Ibid. 
 
30 Ibid. 
 
31 Ibid., 70-71. 
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still left free, and only the abuse of this free-will is the object of legal 
punishment.’32  
 
Based upon this interpretation of freedom of speech and considering the absence 
of any stated definition in either the Constitution or the Bill of Rights,33 the Sedition Act 
was permissible and even progressive, given its deviation from British tradition in the 
jurisdiction of juries as opposed to judges, the requirement of malicious intent, and the 
permission of truth as defense.34 However, the Republican viewpoint on the proper 
definition differed significantly, as Republican legislators used the Bill of Rights as a 
foundation to argue against the imposition of British common law at the American 
federal level, questioning the truth defense allowance and the resting of the burden of 
proof upon the defense as opposed to the prosecution.35 Ultimately, the Republicans were 
overridden, and the legislation became law, though designed to expire in 1801.36 
Before it could do so, the Sedition Act was vigorously enforced by Federalist 
congressmen, Cabinet members, and even Federalist newspapers desiring increased 
profits as Republican papers were shut down by prosecutions and fines.37 A temporary 
victory, the law allowed for the arrest of a Republican congressman critical of the 
Federalist president and electoral gains in the House during the next election cycle.38 
Instead of discouraging Republican-controlled or Republican-favoring papers to back 
                                                        
32 Taylor, “The Alien and Sedition Acts,” 70-71. 
 
33 Ibid., 71. 
 
34 Ibid., 70-71. 
 
35 Ibid., 71-72. 
 
36 Ibid., 72. 
 
37 Ibid., 72-74. 
 
38 Ibid. 
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down from critiquing Federalist actions, such organizations instead increased their 
opposition.39 The ease of tension with France that followed shortly and the cessation of 
bellicosity was likewise a great detriment to the party, which had hoped to use the 
conflict as a platform to accomplish its goals.40 In the 1800 elections, Republicans gained 
a majority in the House, an even stance in the Senate, and a presidential victory with the 
election of Thomas Jefferson.41 The Republican rise to power signified the end of the 
Federalist Party, which later descended to obscurity and oblivion.42 
The constitutional violations of civil liberties constituted by the Alien and 
Sedition Acts and the subsequent political defeat of the Federalist Party43 speak volumes 
for the liberty and security debate. The events of the nation’s founding and the buildup to 
a potential conflict with France both showcase a particular implication regarding the 
sacrifice of either freedom or security for the sake of the other. The unfortunate historical 
example of the Federalist Party demonstrates that in the face of pressing national security 
concerns, issues regarding civil liberty maintain precedence.  
Unfortunately, the US Intelligence Community has been slow to comprehend and 
implement this lesson. In 2014, the United States became aware of a massive data 
collection program that had unintentionally surveilled its own citizens.44 The public was 
                                                        
39 Taylor, “The Alien and Sedition Acts,” 74. 
 
40 Ibid. 
 
41 Ibid. 
 
42 Ibid., 74-75. 
 
43 Ibid., 63-75. 
 
44 Bart Gellman, Julie Tate, and Ashkan Soltani, “In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far 
outnumber the foreigners who are,” The Washington Post, last modified July 5, 2014, accessed November 
27, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-nsa-intercepted-data-those-not-
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outraged, calling the program a violation of American constitutional rights.45 However, 
the collection program’s defenders argued that collection against US citizens had been 
incidental, with the true intelligence targets being foreign nationals.46 Intelligence 
collection against foreign nationals is not bound by the constitutional strictures that apply 
to American citizens but instead falls under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, which created the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to 
regulate electronic surveillance on behalf of the Intelligence Community.47 
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was a product of factors set in motion 
long before its passage in 1978.48 American civil liberties had been under siege from both 
the executive and legislative branch, often via the Intelligence Community, for decades. 
“…In 1940… Roosevelt’s order narrowed the use of wiretapping to listening in on 
espionage by foreign agents… President Harry S. Truman, presiding over the beginning 
of the Cold War, approved the tapping of phones in cases involving ‘domestic 
security.’”49 These directives, among others, began the slippery slope of compromising 
the individual freedoms of American citizens in the name of national security, 
particularly as the Cold War grew in intensity and bitterness.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
targeted-far-outnumber-the-foreigners-who-are/2014/07/05/8139adf8-045a-11e4-8572-
4b1b969b6322_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.375057730169 
 
45 Bart Gellman, Julie Tate, and Ashkan Soltani, “In NSA-intercepted data, those not targeted far 
outnumber the foreigners who are.” 
 
46 Ibid. 
 
47 James McAdams, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA): An Overview, FLETC.gov, 1-2, 
accessed March 20, 2018, https://www.fletc.gov/sites/default/files/imported_files/training/programs/legal-
division/downloads-articles-and-faqs/research-by-
subject/miscellaneous/ForeignIntelligenceSurveillanceAct.pdf 
 
48 Ibid., 2. 
 
49 Thomas Allen, Declassified: 50 Top-Secret Documents That Changed History, (Washington, 
D.C.: National Geographic, 2008), 276.  
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The turbulent political arena of the early 1970s spawned trouble for the 
Intelligence Community.50 Johnson writes, “The setting in Washington at the time 
included a resurgent Congress, which had resolved to halt the erosion of its powers at the 
hands of what Arthur Schlesinger famously described as the “imperial presidency,” 
symbolized most conspicuously by the events known in shorthand as “Watergate” and 
“Vietnam.””51 Many ambitious policymakers saw a sensational exposé on government 
overreach in the civil liberties arena as the ticket to power. One such politician was Idaho 
Senator Frank Church, who hoped to ride the wave of fame stemming from the 
committee that bore his name to a presidency.52  
 The recent scandals faced by the legislative branches were deeply interconnected 
with those of the Intelligence Community. For decades, the Intelligence Community had 
operated with virtually no oversight, briefing only the president on ongoing intelligence 
activities, and that only when absolutely necessary.53 Against this backdrop, Senator 
Church led a congressional inquiry into executive overreach in national security.54 The 
Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence 
                                                        
50 Samuel Walker, Presidents and Civil Liberties From Wilson to Obama: A Story of Poor 
Custodians, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 327-335. 
 
51 Loch K. Johnson, “James Angleton and the Church Committee,” Journal of Cold War Studies, 
15(4), Fall 2013, 128-147, para. 2, accessed April 13, 2018,  
http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.liberty.edu/article/534418 
 
52 Walker, Presidents and Civil Liberties from Wilson to Obama, 334. 
 
53 Johnson, “James Angleton and the Church Committee.” 
 
54 Ibid. 
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Activities, or the Church Committee,55 attempted to rein in the Intelligence Community, 
particularly the CIA, to which he referred as “‘a rogue elephant on a rampage.’”56 
The Church Committee in 1975 began to unearth programs and actions conducted 
by the Intelligence Community that constituted potentially serious legal violations.57 The 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) remained the primary focus of the Committee’s 
inquiry after the revelation of several incriminating programs. Operation CHAOS, the 
agency’s surveillance and collection against anti-war protestors during Vietnam, included 
Project HT Lingual, the opening of first-class mail in violation of the First Amendment 
rights and federal law.58 These operations, among others, caused an uproar when 
information regarding its illegality was leaked to the New York Times.59 The Huston Plan, 
enacted under President Nixon, granted the Intelligence Community the ability to violate 
the First and Fourth Amendment rights of student groups on university campuses.60 The 
president believed these groups or at least a percentage of their members were in 
collusion with the Communist Party in an attempt to overthrow the United States.61 
However, by far the most damaging was a leak that occurred after Director of Central 
                                                        
55 Federal Judicial Center, “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and Court of Review, 1978-
present,” n.d., retrieved from https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-
and-court-review-1978-present  
 
56 Walker, Presidents and Civil Liberties From Wilson to Obama, 334. 
 
57 Ibid. 
 
58 Johnson, “James Angleton and the Church Committee.” 
 
59 Ibid. 
 
60 Melissa Graves, “Reform in the IC: Nixon’s Huston Plan,” International Journal of Intelligence 
and CounterIntelligence. Vol.30 Iss.1, published online November 2, 2016, 152-153, accessed March 26, 
2018, 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08850607.2016.1230705?needAccess=true#aHR0cHM6Ly9
3d3cudGFuZGZvbmxpbmUuY29tL2RvaS9wZGYvMTAuMTA4MC8wODg1MDYwNy4yMDE2LjEyMz
A3MDU/bmVlZEFjY2Vzcz10cnVlQEBAMA== 
 
61 Ibid., 151-153. 
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Intelligence James R. Schlesinger ordered the compilation of a list of all constitutional 
violations carried out by the agency in an attempt to solve many of the CIA’s problems 
in-house.62 This list, known as “the family jewels,”63 caused the CIA significant 
embarrassment when it leaked to the New York Times and was published for the world to 
read.64 
However, the CIA was not the only agency to lose face during the Church 
Committee’s investigation. Church Committee lawyers also discovered a secret Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) counterintelligence program, Cointelpro, which “had 
harassed civil rights activists and Vietnam War dissidents in an attempt to fray and often 
break apart family and friendship ties.”65 This revelation, on top of the realization that the 
Bureau had maintained files on a million US citizens without court approval and had 
investigated nearly half that number, only added fuel to the Church Committee fire.66  
The last straw for many Americans was the result of the Committee’s 
investigation into the National Security Agency (NSA). The NSA’s involvement in a 
program codenamed SHAMROCK, which raised questions of constitutionality when 
Committee lawyers discovered that telegram companies had been providing overseas 
transmissions to the NSA, including the communications of American citizens to foreign 
nationals overseas, a historical foreshadowing of the current NSA data collection 
                                                        
62 Johnson, “James Angleton and the Church Committee.”  
 
63 Ibid. 
 
64 Ibid. 
 
65 Loch K. Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies: The Experience 
and Legacy of the Church Committee,” Public Administration Review, 64(1), 3-14, January-February 2004, 
6, accessed April 2, 2018, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542622?pq-
origsite=summon&seq=4#page_scan_tab_contents 
 
66 Johnson, “James Angleton and the Church Committee.”  
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controversy.67 The program revealed had existed during the presidency of Harry Truman 
in 1952 as a leftover from the Second World War, though it was uncertain whether any 
president or attorney general since had been informed of its existence, much less granted 
permission for it to continue.68 While the NSA denied that its analysts had read American 
messages, the fact that private companies had contributed to such violations of 
constitutional privacy was solely alarming.69  
SHAMROCK was not the only questionable program unearthed by the Church 
Committee. “Under Operation MINARET, begun in the late 1960s, the agency compiled 
a watch list of dissenters, deserters, and anyone participating in civil disturbances, 
including notable individuals like Joan Baez, Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and Jane 
Fonda, which it distributed to the army and other government agencies.”70 As 
unconstitutional programs began to pile up, the Church Committee’s report grew in 
significance as well as potential impact for both the Intelligence Community and 
Congress.71 
The committee’s report, when it was finally published, prompted major changes 
to the Intelligence Community, primarily in the area of executive approval, while 
affirming its importance to national security and acknowledging the necessity of 
                                                        
67 L. Britt Snider, “Unlucky Shamrock: Recollections from the Church Committee’s Investigation 
of NSA,” Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1999, accessed April 13, 2018, https://search-proquest-
com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/docview/1679112668?accountid=12085 
 
68 Ibid. 
 
69 Ibid. 
 
70 Katherine Scott, Reining in the State: Civil Society and Congress in the Vietnam and Watergate 
Eras, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2013), 144. 
 
71 Ibid., 144-145.  
 19 
operational covert action capacity.72 “The committee insisted on greater Congressional 
and policymaker oversight of intelligence…”73 This was accomplished through the 
establishment of the intelligence oversight committees in both houses of Congress; the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence was established in 1976 as a direct result of the 
Church committee’s report.74 Johnson explains, “The Senate put into place a potentially 
effective standing committee, equipped with a large and experienced professional staff, 
devoted to monitoring the secret agencies day by day and reviewing their programs and 
budgets with a fine-tooth comb.”75 The House followed suit with its own intelligence 
committee.76 No longer would the CIA or the NSA have free rein to enact any 
surveillance or covert action operations against American citizens or without prior 
approval, at minimum, of the attorney general.77 Also, no longer would the president 
have full and total control over the actions of the Intelligence Community,78 as the 
Church Committee’s research proved that, despite Church’s elephant metaphor, many of 
the CIA’s questionable actions had been presidentially approved.79  
Another direct result of the Church Committee’s investigation and eventual report 
was the creation of legislation dictating the requirement of judicial approval for 
                                                        
72 Central Intelligence Agency,  “A Look Back… The Church Committee Meets,” www.cia.gov, 
2011, accessed April 13, 2018, https://search-proquest-com.ezproxy.liberty.edu/docview/1679073735?pq-
origsite=summon&accountid=12085. 
 
73 Ibid., para. 3 
 
74 Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies,” 10-11. 
 
75 Ibid., 10. 
 
76 Ibid. 
 
77 McAdams, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA): An Overview. 
 
78 Scott, Reining in the State, 162. 
 
79 Walker, Presidents and Civil Liberties From Wilson to Obama, 334.  
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surveillance and intelligence collection regarding particularly signals intelligence 
(SIGINT).80 Walker writes, “The eventual FISA law was a compromise that for the first 
time granted the federal government explicit wiretap authority in national security cases 
but subjected it to procedural controls.”81 This authority and control eventually emerged 
from the legislative process in the form of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
1978.82  
As a result of the Church Committee’s inquiry, “an Act to authorize electronic 
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information”83 or the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) was introduced to Congress in 1977.84 FISA fundamentally 
changed the way intelligence agencies operated. The legislation marked the beginning of 
a new perspective on civil liberties and intelligence collection in the name of national 
security.85 Walker claims, “The FISA law, the War Powers Act, and the new 
congressional intelligence committees were the monuments of the post-Watergate era 
efforts to subject national security activities to the rule of law.”86 FISA reigned in both 
                                                        
80 Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies.” 
 
81 Walker, Presidents and Civil Liberties From Wilson to Obama, 370. 
 
82 Johnson, “Congressional Supervision of America’s Secret Agencies.” 
 
83 Congress.gov, “S.1566 - An Act to Authorize Electronic Surveillance to Obtain Foreign 
Intelligence Information,” n.d., retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/95th-congress/senate-
bill/1566?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22public+law+95-511%22%5D%7D&r=1 
 
84 Ibid. 
 
85 Walker, Presidents and Civil Liberties From Wilson to Obama, 369. 
 
86 Ibid. 
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the operational surveillance capabilities of the Intelligence Community87 and the 
authority of the president to arbitrarily order electronic surveillance.88   
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as passed, included provisions 
regulating a myriad of electronic surveillance activities conducted by the Intelligence 
Community towards foreign nationals within the continental United States.89 The act 
made any unauthorized surveillance by a law enforcement or intelligence officer illegal, 
as well as establishing precedent for the legality and use of any intelligence collected 
during such surveillance in criminal proceedings.90  It “permit[ed] the President, acting 
through the Attorney General, to authorize electronic surveillances for foreign 
intelligence purposes without a court order in certain circumstances.”91 However, the 
attorney general was required to ascertain that surveillance methods conformed to 
established requirements before authorization, and to inform the Senate and House 
Intelligence Committees of these methods 30 days in advance of their application.92 He or 
she is also required to report to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
annually on the number of requests submitted and whether those requests were authorized 
or denied, as well as reporting to Congress and its respective Intelligence Committees, 
which were in turn required to report once every five years to the full House and 
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Senate.93 Finally, the Act allowed the President to authorize 15 days of surveillance on a 
foreign target without authorization of the Court in a time of war.94 
The Attorney General’s responsibility increased significantly in regards to 
intelligence collection under FISA. He or she was to provide a copy of the authorization 
for electronic surveillance to the appropriate court before the action is undertaken.95 The 
Attorney General also had the power to authorize electronic surveillance in an emergency 
scenario without waiting for approval from a FISA judge, given that the judge was 
notified of the action and the approval requested within 24 hours.96 This emergency 
authority could last only for 24 hours, until the necessary intelligence was gathered, or 
until the appropriate judge approved the surveillance request.97  
The passage of FISA had immediate and drastic effects on the Intelligence 
Community, most directly the CIA, FBI, and NSA. It increased the oversight both of the 
legislature, through  . the recently established House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees,98 and the judiciary, through the establishment of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court.99 It also shifted power to authorize electronic surveillance away from 
the direct control of the sitting US President,100 a practice which had historically proved 
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detrimental to the Intelligence Community itself and to overall national security and the 
protection of civil liberties.101  
First, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act protected the Intelligence 
Community from the arbitrary and often unconstitutional requests of US presidents. FISA 
was designed to “protect Americans from ‘the unchecked power of the President to 
engage in foreign intelligence electronic surveillances,’ a major accomplishment 
considering that ‘the personal attitudes of executive-branch officials remain the only 
governing standard for such operations.’”102 The powerful president could bend the 
Intelligence Community to his will, forcing them to condone and conduct 
unconstitutional actions against American citizens, but the intelligence agencies and their 
leaders and officers had no recourse.103 FISA neutralized these problems by transferring 
the authorization power for intelligence actions from the executive branch to the 
legislative through the establishment of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees.104  
The passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act did more than protect 
the Intelligence Community from the whims of any particular US president; it also served 
to protect the Intelligence Community from itself.105 While certain of the unconstitutional 
programs revealed by the Church Committee were initiated or advocated by the 
President, the Intelligence Community had instigated several unconstitutional programs 
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on its own volition, including the Huston Plan.106 Graves writes, “When Nixon had 
revoked his authorization of the [Huston] plan five days after authorizing it, the agencies 
expressed their disappointment and quietly went back to doing everything the Huston 
Plan had authorized to them, without presidential direction or approval.”107 The 
willingness of intelligences agencies to compromise the freedoms they had sworn to 
protect in order to accomplish their mission was troubling,108 and the programs brought to 
light by the congressional investigations soon made it clear that the Intelligence 
Community required an outside control mechanism to rein in its own self-destructive 
tendency to violate civil liberties in the name of national security.109 FISA provided the 
oversight to curb Intelligence Community leeway by requiring approval before electronic 
surveillance requests were authorized.110 Walker writes, “What is unknown, of course is 
the extent to which the mere existence of the FISA process deterred the government from 
seeking many dubious requests or forced it to do more investigation to provide a 
justifiable request.”111 While as a counterfactual the true impact of the FISA court and its 
requirements on the Intelligence Community cannot be calculated, “Robert M. Gates, a 
career intelligence officer and DCI under the first President Bush….[stated that]‘[S]ome 
awfully crazy schemes might well have been approved had everyone present not known 
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and expected hard questions, debate, and criticism from the Hill…’”112 either from the 
congressional Intelligence Committees that had been co-products of the Church 
Committee alongside FISA or from the judges of the FISA court. The fact remains that 
FISA has done much to ensure that the Intelligence Community minds the delicate 
balance between constitutional freedoms and national security, primarily by consistently 
reminding intelligence agencies of the necessity of conforming to congressionally-set 
expectations.113  
Finally, FISA served to protect the Intelligence Community from accusations of 
impropriety and unconstitutionality from the media and the American public. The 
continuous saga of intelligence revelations in the national media throughout the Church 
Committee investigations had served to undermine the image and credibility of the 
Intelligence Community in the eyes of the American public.114  
Scott summarizes, “After years of disclosures of extralegal activities by 
intelligence agencies, which at the least violated certain constitutional, if not legal rights, 
the American public was in no mood to trust its leaders.”115 The imposition of controls 
and oversight on the Intelligence Community served to reassure the public that the 
intelligence agencies were indeed working on their behalf, striving to protect them from 
threats to national security, not constituting a threat to their liberties.116 The restrictions 
imposed by FISA and the necessity of authorization from the FISA court discouraged the 
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belief that the Intelligence Community was, in Senator Church’s words, “a rogue 
elephant,”117 free to undertake any form of intelligence collection, without any attempt at 
oversight or concern for civil freedoms.118  
Despite FISA’s success at reigning in overreach on the part of the Executive 
Branch and the Intelligence Community, it still suffered its share of failures and 
controversy. Walker writes, “Although a historic step toward controlling national security 
intelligence gathering, FISA proved to be as flawed as its critics feared.”119 One of the 
most decried aspects of FISA was the method in which the FISA court conducted itself, 
particularly its lack of restraint upon the Intelligence Community. Walker expounds, 
“The FISA court was exceedingly compliant and granted virtually all government 
requests for warrants. Between 1978 and 2004, it rejected a grand total of 5 requests 
while granting 18,761. And perhaps four of those rejected were later granted after being 
modified to satisfy the court.”120  
FISA critics also emphasized the secrecy of both the electronic surveillance 
allowed by FISA and the FISA Court itself.121 Rule writes, “The FISA court would 
deliberate in secret, so that targets of surveillance would not be aware of the fact unless 
ultimately prosecuted. Nor…would the public have the opportunity to evaluate 
appropriateness of the permissions that it granted…”122 Thus FISA fell prey to the 
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paradox that often afflicts national security programs: the challenge of maintaining an 
aura of transparency and accountability to oversight that will satiate the American public 
while maintaining the upmost secrecy possible. The establishment of the House and 
Senate Select Committees on Intelligence served to allay this dilemma as much as 
possible by providing an avenue for accountability of the intelligence services that had 
clearance to receive and understand classified information.123  
While FISA remains the law of the land in regards to restrictions on electronic 
and other methods of surveillance, the legislation has undergone multiple alterations 
since its passage. FISA was first amended in 1994 to widen its application from only 
electronic surveillance to physical searches.124 Congress authorized the expansion of 
FISA provisions to extend to searches of physical property, arguing that these searches 
should be included under the jurisdiction of the entire FISA Court as opposed to solely 
that of the Attorney General.125 Smaller changes also occurred in the following years, as 
in 2000, when Congress expanded FISA’s definition of a foreign agent to workers of 
foreign governments who either use or obtain a false identification, or in 2001, when 
legislation clarified which sectors of federal investigators could utilize FISA 
procedures.126 
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However, a major change was wrought to FISA courts and legislation after the 
tragedy of September 11, 2001.127 Bamford writes, “For years, under [NSA Director 
Michael Hayden’s] leadership, the agency had deliberately taken an overly cautious 
approach to eavesdropping and, possibly as a result, contributed to the intelligence 
failures that led to the attacks. Now he had a different priority.”128 This change of 
direction was spearheaded by then-Vice President Dick Cheney.129 Bamford writes, “He 
also had serious disagreements with even the existence of FISA, an impediment on 
presidential power that he believed ‘served to erode the authority I think the president 
needs to be effective, especially in a national security area.’”130 The problem of 
maintaining homeland security once again brought to the forefront of national discussion 
by a failure to do so on behalf of the world’s premier intelligence agencies, and the White 
House began to push an expansion of FISA protocol and procedures.131 
Bamford also points out one of the problems with FISA rising from 9/11: 
“‘…Under existing laws like FISA, you have to have the name of somebody, have to 
already suspect that someone’s a terrorist before you can get a warrant…”132 Intelligence 
agencies, particularly the NSA in regards to signals intelligence (SIGINT) or cyber 
intelligence (CYBER), could identify the locations of individuals involved in al-Qaeda, 
but could not request warrants to tap communications because they could not identify the 
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individuals to complete a FISA warrant.133 The congressional effort to correct this lack of 
surveillance authority to reach those responsible for the national tragedy resulted in the 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001.  
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, or the USA PATRIOT Act,134 
expanded the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in several areas. 
First, it allowed for the sharing of collected intelligence on foreign targets between 
intelligence agencies and with law enforcement,135 The PATRIOT Act expanded FISA 
procedures to account for this flaw, primarily through authorizing interagency 
communication and the sharing of intelligence gained through electronic surveillance.136  
This legislation also upheld FISA as the determining standard for electronic 
surveillance procedures, as well as increasing the number of judges presiding over the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court from seven, as the original bill had indicated, to 
eleven.137 The law also adjusted FISA warrant requirements. Rule writes, “Instead of 
allowing secret monitoring of communications only for investigations declared to have 
obtaining foreign intelligence information as their ‘primary purpose,’ Patriot Act 
language permits such investigations where such intelligence was a ‘significant 
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purpose.’”138 Finally, the expansion of the time period of surveillance for foreign targets 
was one of the law’s most crucial amendments to the original FISA protocols.139 
Aside from critiques against the permissibility of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court, the actual FISA legislation accomplished much of what it was 
designed to do. However, that did not stop future presidents from ignoring it outright 
when necessary. One of the largest controversies surrounding FISA legislation occurred 
under the Bush Administration in 2005.140 Walker writes, “FISA exploded into a major 
controversy under President George W. Bush when it was revealed that he authorized 
secret wiretaps evading the law altogether. That controversy was a sobering commentary 
on the limits of not just FISA but all of the post-Watergate national security reforms.”141 
The subsequent investigation revealed that the Bush administration had tapped the NSA 
to conduct illegal wiretaps on American citizens in the immediate aftermath of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks on World Trade Center and the Pentagon.142 Exposure of the 
program resulted when an employee of one of the involved communications corporations 
had discovered the NSA’s use of equipment within the facility where he worked, and 
soon the nation was shocked to discover that the NSA had, against the congressional 
limitations of FISA, illegally wiretapped American citizens.143 
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The problem for the Bush Administration, particularly Vice President Dick 
Cheney and attorney David Addington, began when FISA started turning down his 
administration’s requests for warrants in the wake of 9/11.144 Bamford writes, “Judges on 
the court kicked back more wiretap requests from the Bush administration than from the 
four previous administrations combined.”145 Cheney and others in the administration also 
had a deep-seated resentment for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act as detracting 
from presidential authority and thus jeopardizing national security.146 Frustrated at their 
failure to gain the court’s approval for the measures they felt were necessary to deter 
another terrorist attack and to hunt down those responsible for the devastation,147 “after 
9/11 they [Cheney and Addington]…dealt with FISA the way they dealt with other laws 
they didn’t like: they blew through them in secret.”148 With Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, underling John C. Yoo, and NSA Director Michael Hayden, Cheney and 
Addington began looking for a way to avoid what they viewed as the court’s impediment 
of necessary homeland security strategies.149 This circumvention of the FISA 
requirements and the FISA court resulted in the development of a program that, through 
cooperation with companies, allowed the NSA to spy on incoming and outgoing 
messages in the form of both phone calls and emails.150  
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While NSA Director Hayden lacked Cheney’s derision for the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, he “complained that it was designed for an earlier period of 
time,”151 and this belief impacted his actions in regard to the NSA’s wiretap program, 
which was designed to bypass “cumbersome and time-consuming”152 FISA procedures. 
As a result, Hayden found himself briefing the congressional intelligence committees on 
a related program that provided the springboard for the wiretaps.153 Then, “just days after 
the briefing, on October 4, Hayden received authorization to bypass the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court and begin eavesdropping on international 
communications to and from Americans without a warrant.”154 The NSA had managed to 
completely nullify FISA restrictions, and the Intelligence Community once again began 
to closely reflect Senator Church’s “rogue elephant on a rampage.”155  
How had a premier US intelligence agency and a sitting US President managed to 
completely circumvent the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, despite its expansions 
under the recently passed USA PATRIOT Act? FISA, despite the alterations of the 
PATRIOT Act, stood squarely in the path of such a program, as did its court.156 Neither 
was capable of preventing the executive decision to merely ignore the constitutional 
requirements for electronic surveillance in the name of national security.157 In fact, 
“except for the presiding judge, Royce Lamberth, the FISA Court was also kept in the 
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dark about the NSA’s warrantless program.”158  Lamberth was called into a meeting with 
Ashcroft, Yoo, and Hayden regarding the program, but rather than being consulted on the 
legality of such a program, he was informed that the “presidential decision”159 to enact 
the program had already been made. Lamberth had no alternative but to go along with the 
program; the safeguards imposed by FISA had been steamrolled in the name of national 
security.160 He would later critique the program publicly, warning, “‘We have to 
understand you can fight the war [on terrorism] and lose everything if you have no civil 
liberties left when you get through fighting the war.’”161 
 Unfortunately for the NSA, it did not seem to learn its lesson, for 2005 would not 
be the last time it was caught in violation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. As 
referenced above, in 2014 the NSA was revealed to be collecting the communications of 
US citizens while conducting a data mining program targeted towards foreign nationals 
after a contractor leaked classified FISA information pulled from NSA computers.162 
Once again, despite its best efforts at congressional and judicial oversight, the 
Intelligence Community was found on the wrong side of the fine line separating actions 
that ensure national security and those that violate the freedoms of the people it protects. 
The story that one of America’s premier intelligence agencies, the NSA, was 
running a top-secret data collection and retention program that had inadvertently gathered 
information on American citizens shocked the public when it was leaked by NSA 
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contractor Edward Snowden.163 Washington Post reporter Bart Gellman published an 
article on the NSA’s data collection programs in 2014, detailing the NSA’s activities in 
programs such as PRISM and Upstream.164 Gellman explained the accidental collection 
of data of American citizens including medical records, transcripts, and personal 
photographs as an unintended side effect of an attempt to target foreign actors who posed 
potential threats to national security.165 The surveillance of Americans under these 
programs raised concerns about potential violations of the rights guaranteed to American 
citizens in the Bill of Rights. 
The primary problems arose in the retention of the data and the amount of data 
collected relating to citizens versus the amount collected on the actual intended target.166 
The NSA kept much of the collected information, regardless of its relevance to current 
targets or ongoing operations, unwilling to let any potential intelligence slip through the 
cracks.167 This practice raised concerns given Gellman’s analysis that 9 out of 10 pieces 
of data were unrelated to foreign targets.168  
While many people were quick to condemn the NSA’s actions, specifically in 
retaining the personal information of American citizens, American Enterprise Institute’s 
Gary Schmitt makes a valid observation that increased cyber surveillance for the sake of 
national security was “demanded from the intelligence community in the wake of 9/11 in 
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order to help to preempt similar attacks.”169 Reeling from the events of September 11, 
2001 that left thousands of Americans dead, the American public began pressuring law 
enforcement and intelligence communities to step up their counterterrorism activities and 
forces.170 As a result, Congress swiftly passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, which, among other things, created the position of Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) and reformed the process by which intelligence agencies 
share intelligence. Congress later enacted the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which 
allowed the targeting of foreign actors outside the continental US under certain strict 
limitations, including the provisions of the Fourth Amendment, and which established the 
responsibility of the Attorney General and the Intelligence Community in overseeing 
counterterrorism activity under FISA.171 
In discussions of privacy violations, the First and Fourth Amendment are often 
cited.172 The First Amendment guarantees the freedoms of speech, press, religion, 
petition, and assembly.173 Some would argue that programs such as the NSA’s data 
collection of American citizens violate their freedoms of speech and press by cataloguing 
their online discussions, or even the right to assemble, given that some data was collected 
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in online chat rooms, even of those who did not comment but were merely present.174 The 
Fourth Amendment states that, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches ands seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation…”175  
Several problems arise in any attempt to define the constitutionality of programs 
related to data collection on any form of cyber platform. According to Paul Rosenzweig, 
a Heritage Foundation Fellow, “…information you disclose to a third party is not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment. In the context of data privacy, that means that there 
is no constitutional protection against the collection and aggregation of your cyber data 
(credit card purchase and the like) for purposes of data analysis…”176 His comment on 
third party information is a reference to the Supreme Court case Smith v. Maryland, 
where “the Court held that… when we reveal private information to a third party, we lose 
privacy rights over it.”177 This case determined that data freely given to an outside source 
is no longer under Fourth Amendment protection;178 according to this precedent, the 
NSA’s collection program would pass as constitutional because the information is freely 
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shared with outside sources and then collected by the agency from those sources which 
are not protected by the Fourth Amendment.  
Rosenzweig goes on to explain that a further problem with claiming invasion of 
privacy by the NSA is the lack of applicability of current privacy laws to modern data 
collection.179 Put simply, privacy protection requirements are so antiquated as to be 
useless in defining what is legal or illegal in regards to modern data collection.180 These 
laws are collated into a series of criteria known as the Fair Information Principles, which 
defined different aspects of privacy and dictated the constitutional limits of government 
access into the private lives of its citizens.181 However, many of these requirements are 
either inapplicable to data collection via modern Internet sources or fly in the face of the 
purpose of data collection in providing information from which analysts can extract 
valuable intelligence.182 The ever-changing definitions of privacy, anonymity, and 
obscurity, as referenced by Rosenzweig in his testimony, do nothing to assist in clarifying 
this argument.183 What, then, is the final analysis of the programs’ constitutionally? 
 The only true litmus test for a breach of constitutional limitation on federal 
government is the Constitution itself, in this case specifically the Bill of Rights. The most 
relevant amendment to the NSA’s programs is the Fourth, which defends against the 
unqualified search of a person or their belongings, to include material and intellectual 
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property.184 It would seem simple that the collection of a person’s online postings or 
messages by a federal agency would be a violation of this constitutional protection if not 
for the precedent set by the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland.185 It is the 
responsibility of the Court to apply the Constitution and its amendments faithfully within 
a modern context that is not specifically spelled out in the original documents themselves. 
In the case of Smith, the Court ruled that information voluntarily surrendered to a third 
party was not protected under the Fourth Amendment, because the owner of that 
intellectual property had willingly released it to an actor outside of him or herself.186 
What happened to the information afterwards was not a matter of constitutionality, and it 
is under the cover of this third-party precedent that the NSA’s programs fall. Because the 
American Internet users voluntarily turned this information over to either internet 
providers, which PRISM targeted,187 or to other individuals via the Internet, they can no 
longer claim constitutional protection for that information under the Fourth 
Amendment.188 Thus, it is not a constitutional violation for the NSA to collect this data 
for its own purposes.   
The other controversial aspect of the NSA revelations is the retention of this data 
by the agency once it determined it to be inconsequential.189 However, as problematic as 
this practice may strike some, it is not specifically addressed by the Constitution. In the 
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name of national security, this information continues to be collected and archived in the 
hope that eventually it may be used as a small piece of the puzzle that will prevent future 
attacks or deter potential threats against the United States and all of its citizens.  
James Carafano summarized this analysis well when he wrote for the Heritage 
Foundation: 
It is clear that the NSA has sufficient legal authority to conduct legitimate 
counterterrorism surveillance. It cannot be determined, from what is publically 
available, whether the NSA faithfully followed the law or whether the 
surveillance, even if legal, was appropriate to the threats being addressed. It is, 
however, up to the instruments of ordered liberty to provide us satisfactory 
answers.190 
  
While no American citizen would condone even the implication that his or her rights 
were being infringed upon by federal government, a strong case exists to support the 
conclusion that the NSA’s actions were and are constitutional, enacted in the hopes of 
protecting American citizens from a catastrophic national security disaster on par with the 
event that triggered the genesis of these programs.  
However, an important facet of this discussion is the relevance of the original 
context of these programs. The months and years following the unprecedented terror 
attacks of September 11, 2001, left the nation in a state of panic, confusion, and fear. 
Measures needed to be taken both to assuage the fears of the public and to deter other 
attacks in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, while US national security and military forces 
were trying to regain their footing and determine responsibility.191 Bamford writes, “Civil 
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liberties were out, Fortress America was in.”192 Americans were more willing to condone 
actions with potential privacy violations in the name of national defense in the wake of 
such a shocking attack than they were more than a decade removed from the horrors of 
September 11: 
[Yoo] noted that while such unprecedented and intrusive actions might be rejected 
on constitutional grounds during normal times, they are now justified as a result 
of the 9/11 attacks. During such times, he said, ‘the government may be justified 
in taking measures which in less troubled conditions could be seen as 
infringements of individual liberties.’193 
 
Situational context is not ultimately a factor in determining constitutionality, but it 
does speak to the creation and implementation of the NSA’s data programs and the 
intention behind them.  
Implications for the US Intelligence Community 
While the NSA’s data collection program may pass the test of constitutionality, 
this does not eliminate the damage done by the initial revelation to the reputation of the 
Intelligence Community, already tragically wounded by the events that brought about the 
formation of Church Committee and subsequently the Intelligence Committees and 
spurred by the FISA revelations of 2005. The circumstances surrounding the birth of the 
United States, the country’s founding documents, and nearly every significant event that 
has occurred in US history reflect this sentiment: the American people always have and 
always will place the value of personal civil freedom above any other concern, including 
the all-important preservation of national security. Intelligence agencies must understand 
and share this perspective if they are to remain effective and relevant in the current 
political environment. Failure to do so on the part of the Federalist Party in 1798 and the 
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Intelligence Community in the 1970s resulted in the death of the party after the 1800 
election and a loss of faith in and increased oversight of the Community in 1970s. Walker 
writes that Church’s “[rogue elephant] metaphor caught the popular imagination and still 
defines the CIA for many people.”194 The US Intelligence Community has, through its 
own actions, lost the trust of the American people, resulting in an attitude of skepticism at 
best and calls for its disestablishment at worst.  
 If Intelligence Community agencies are to continue in their desire to protect the 
United States and its citizens, they must take drastic and immediate steps both to remedy 
its historic problems with civil liberties violations and repair its image in the eyes of 
those it strives to protect.  However, this deference to civil liberty can be difficult for the 
US Intelligence Community, an organization primarily dedicated to the defense of 
national security. In this, as in all other sectors of the debate, perspective is key. The 
Intelligence Community is responsible not only for the protection of the people of the 
United States but also for the protections of the rights of those people. With this in mind, 
it is imperative that the agencies of the Intelligence Community consider the perspective 
of American citizens in the accomplishment of their goals; both the security of the people 
of the United States but the security of their rights must be kept in mind. This trend has 
recently become more apparent in the publications of Intelligence Community agencies. 
The CIA’s official website declares its mission to “preempt threats and further US 
security objectives,”195 while simultaneously addressing concerns over civil liberties: 
“We uphold the highest standards of lawful conduct… We maintain the Nation’s trust 
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through accountability and oversight.”196 The NSA also boasts its commitment to 
“respect for the law”197 and “accountability.”198 The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 
dedicates an entire internal organization to such concerns; the Office of Privacy and Civil 
Liberties advocates the protection of rights, with the reservation of “consistent with 
operational requirements.”199  
Such conditions are entirely the concern. As demonstrated above, Intelligence 
Community agencies tend to view civil liberty considerations as a restriction on their 
ability to accomplish their goals without realizing that the protection of rights is their 
primary goal as one of the most central aspects of protecting American citizens.200 If the 
Intelligence Community is earnest in its desire to protect the United States, its people, 
and their rights, several immediate steps must be taken to correct the current image of the 
Community and to craft a more constitutionally consistent vision moving forward.  
First, the Intelligence Community must work tirelessly to improve the current 
perception of itself that resulted from the exposures of the Church Committee and other 
recent revelations. If the American people cannot trust the Intelligence Community with 
the defense of their constitutional rights, they will be hard-pressed to trust it with their 
lives and livelihoods; therefore, the Intelligence Community must go out of its way to 
assuage concerns over civil liberties in order to fulfill its purpose. Intelligence agencies 
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can accomplish this by immediately ceasing any programs analogous to PRISM, 
SHAMROCK, or anything remotely resembling a potential question of constitutionality. 
Compliance with oversight structures implemented following the Church Committee 
Report, including the congressional Intelligence Committees, is strictly necessary.  
However, merely defensive solutions are not enough to restore American trust in 
the Intelligence Community to a satisfactory point of operation for its agencies. Proactive 
measures must be also be undertaken. The primary problem of the Intelligence 
Community arises from a lack of information. Many Americans view intelligence 
agencies with suspicion simply because they do not understand the practices and 
purposes of the Intelligence Community, and given the nature of intelligence, this is to a 
certain extent irremediable. However, intelligence agencies need to strive for as great a 
measure of transparency as is practical, or at the very least an atmosphere of such. While 
it is often not possible to prove that such practices as those revealed by the Church 
Committee no longer occur, the attitude of Intelligence Community leaders can attempt 
to communicate what their actions feasibly cannot.   
A measure of transparency was initiated with the creation of the position of 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to serve as the public face of the Intelligence 
Community and to represent the IC before Congress and before the American people. 
One aspect of this is the DNI’s annual Worldwide Threat Assessment, a “State of the 
Union” of the Intelligence Community listing and elaborating upon the Intelligence 
Community’s primary foci for the year.201 The 2018 Threat Assessment, presented to the 
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Senate Armed Services Committee202 by current Director of National Intelligence Dan 
Coates, summarized the key threats facing the United States first by topic and then by 
geographic location.203 Such efforts, as well as testimony before Congress by members of 
the Intelligence Community, serve to demonstrate willingness on the part of the 
Intelligence Community to engage with the American people and go far in its attempt to 
demonstrate the depth of its commitment to the protection of themselves and their 
freedoms.   
Conclusion 
 As demonstrated above, the line of demarcation between the protected freedoms 
guaranteed to American citizens and the ceded territory in which the US Intelligence 
Community can conduct its national security activities has been historically inconsistent, 
battered in each direction by continual tides of crises both of security and of dramatic 
overreach on the part of the federal government. The primary question the Intelligence 
Community faces today does not deal with history but with current events and public 
opinion. Where does the line fall in the present and immediate future?  
 The strong negative reaction from the public and correspondingly from the 
legislature surrounding recent incidents such as Gellman’s exposure of PRISM, as well as 
the considerable distance from a significant national security event, indicate that 
America’s citizens are highly unlikely to accept government encroachment into personal 
freedoms in the current political environment, and the Intelligence Community needs to 
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adjust its goals and practices accordingly. The House and Senate Intelligence 
Committees, designed in the aftermath of the Church Committee to provide additional 
oversight for the Intelligence Community, must be mindful both of the current challenges 
faced by intelligence agencies and of their intentions to protect American citizens, not 
endanger them through a reduction of their rights. A spirit of cooperation with oversight 
avenues as well as a degree of transparency are critical, though those responsible for 
intelligence supervision must understand the difficulty of transparency due to the nature 
of intelligence activities.  
 This analysis returns finally to the question of the primacy of liberty. Given the 
historic foundations of the concept of civil freedoms so deeply rooted in America’s 
origins, the first and most basic state of American liberty is its investiture in the hands 
and hearts of the American people.204 If a baseline is to be established, the status quo 
must be the reservation of all rights and freedoms to US citizens, granted temporarily and 
partially to the federal government in order to obtain guarantees or protections not 
otherwise available.205 In the words of Abraham Lincoln, “The legitimate object of 
government, is to do for a community of people, whatever they need to have done, but 
can not do, at all, or can not, so well do, for themselves—in their separate, and individual 
capacities. In all that the people can individually do as well for themselves, government 
ought not to interfere.”206 
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This parameter demonstrates the essential spirit exemplified in the creation of the 
federal government; freedom flows from the American people to the American 
government to accomplish effects otherwise impossible, an allowance that may at any 
time be rescinded.207 While the aims of the US Intelligence Community are easily 
subsumed in the category of goals not achievable by individual citizens and therefore the 
rightful and constitutional jurisdiction of governmental authority,208 the nature of this 
transmission should shape the attitude and viewpoint of Intelligence Community 
agencies. Not only their respective abilities but also their responsibilities are not 
inherently derived from their own goals and institutions but a delegation of power from 
those in whom it resides, namely American citizens.209 As such, agencies have a 
responsibility not solely to respect the rights of Americans as their beneficiaries but as 
their benefactors,210 and intelligence agencies that have sworn to protect US citizens must 
incorporate this belief into their own perspectives of defense of freedoms as inherently 
linked to defense of the country and its people. While tensions between civil liberty and 
national security continue to exist in the present and future for both the Intelligence 
Community and the American people, President Barack Obama summarized best the only 
reliable and reasonable option for the resolution of this debate: 
The men and women of our intelligence community work every single day to 
keep us safe because they love our country and believe in our values. They’re 
patriots. And I believe that those who have lawfully raised their voices on behalf 
of privacy and civil liberties are also patriots who love our country and want it to 
live up to our highest ideals. So this is how we’re going to resolve our differences 
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in the United States—through vigorous public debate, guided by our Constitution, 
with reverence for our history as a nation of laws, and with respect for the facts.211 
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